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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The complexity of the income-tax laws that have been enacted from
time to time, during the past ten years, becomes more and more apparent
as one decision after another is handed down by those whose duty it is
to interpret the varied provisions of these laws. This thought is impressed
on everyone attempting to keep posted on the subject of income taxation.
There is a fine illustration of this condition in treasury decision 3486,
embodying a United States supreme court decision handed down in the case
of Harry T. Graham v. Alfred I. du Pont. The amount of tax
involved as well as the principles brought into review in this case
undoubtedly had the attention of legal talent of the highest order and yet
it was necessary to resort to the highest tribunal before final decision could
be reached. The lucid history of this case as well as the able opinion
rendered by the court and delivered by Chief Justice Taft make the
solution seem simple enough, but of course this apparent simplicity is an
impression one might get of any problem after the solution had been
revealed. The point is quite clear, however, that if there was sufficient
doubt as to the principles involved in this case to render it necessary to
carry the case to the United States supreme court, the chances that the laity
will comprehend the ramifications of the several acts and interpret the
language thereof are limited.
If your client should ask you, Mr. Accountant, whether or not he should
consent to an assessment of additional income tax after the expiration of
the statute of limitations applying to the particular tax proposed to be
assessed even though delay until that time had been agreed upon, would
you recommend that he give his consent—would you, really, if the amount
of tax was $1,576,015.06 and you had some doubt as to the validity of the
tax itself?
Read the decision and then ponder over what your probable reaction
would have been before this decision was made.

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3486—June 1, 1923)
Income tax—Action to restrain collection of taxes—Decision of
Supreme Court.
1. Injunction — Suits to Restrain Collection of Taxes — Section
3224, R. S.
Section 3224, Revised Statutes, prohibits the maintenance of any suit
to restrain the assessment or collection of a federal tax and a collector
of internal revenue can not be restrained by injunction from collecting a
tax assessed, although the bill of complaint alleges as grounds for
equitable relief that the assessment was invalid and complainant had no
adequate remedy at law.
2. Same—Remedy at Law.
The validity of an assessment for federal taxes can not be determined
on injunction but the tax must first be paid and a suit at law brought to
test the correctness of the assessment.
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3. Cases Distinguished.
Cases involving injunctions to restrain the collection of penalties
distinguished.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the
case of Harry T. Graham, former collector of internal revenue, v. Alfred
I. du Pont is published for the information of internal revenue officers
and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 846. October Term, 1922.
Harry T. Graham, former collector of internal revenue, v. Alfred I. du Pont.
Writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
[May 21, 1923]
This is a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the circuit
court of appeals of the third circuit in affirming on appeal a temporary
injunction granted by the district court of Delaware restraining the then
collector of internal revenue for the district of Delaware from levying
a distraint against the property of the complainant, Alfred I. du Pont, to
collect the sum of $1,576,015.06 assessed against him by the commissioner
of internal revenue.
In a reorganization of a du Pont Powder Co. of New Jersey and the
organization of a new du Pont Powder Co. of Delaware to take over many
of the assets of the old company the complainant in the year 1915 received
75,534 shares of the common stock of the Delaware Co. of the par value
of $100 each. The transaction was the subject of consideration by this
court in United States v. Phellis (257 U. S. 156), where it was determined
that shares in the Delaware Co. received by stockholders of the New
Jersey Co., as the complainant received his, at the rate of two in the
Delaware Co. in exchange for one in the New Jersey Co., was a separa
tion of past accumulation of profits from the capital of the New Jersey
Co. and a distribution to the stockholders, and thus constituted taxable
income under the income-tax law of 1913.
The complainant filed a return and an amended return in March, 1916,
of his income for the year 1915, in which he did not include these shares.
In November, 1917, the department began an investigation into the liability
of the complainant to pay an income tax on his shares of stock in the
Delaware Co. and finally ordered an assessment of $1,576,015.06. The
complainant was notified of this assessment made December 31, 1919. He
replied the next day that as his return for 1915 was filed before March 15,
1916, and as the law required any assessment for additional amount to be
made within three years, and that period had expired, the assessment and
demand for payment were illegal. On February 2, 1920, a hearing was
granted to counsel for complainant by the commissioner of internal revenue.
On March 8, 1920, complainant filed a claim for the abatement of the
assessment of $1,576,015.06 as void because made after the limitation of
three years had expired and because the tax was on something that was
not income under the law.
Thereafter by agreement between the stockholders similarly situated,
one stockholder, Phellis, paid the tax due under a similar assessment and
brought suit in the court of claims to recover it. Counsel for the com
plainant herein took part in the argument of that case. The court of
claims gave judgment against the United States, but on appeal the judg
ment was reversed. The opinion of the court was handed down November
21, 1921. All claims for abatement had been held and not decided by the
commissioner under an agreement with the counsel in the Phellis case.
Thereafter the commissioner rejected complainant’s claim for abatement.
The bill of complainant was filed January 30, 1922. The district court
granted the temporary injunction. The circuit court of appeals on appeal
affirmed the temporary injunction for the reasons stated in the opinion of
the district court.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court.
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Section 3224, Revised Statutes, provides that “No suit for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court.” In Cheatham v. United States (92 U. S. 85, 88), State
Railroad Taxes (92 U. S. 575, 613), and in Snyder v. Marks (109 U. S.
189, 193), it was said that the system prescribed by the United States in
regard to both customs duties and internal revenue taxes, of stringent
measures not judicial, to collect them, with appeals to specified tribunals
and suits to recover back moneys illegally exacted, was a system of cor
rective justice intended to be complete, and enacted under the right
belonging to the government to prescribe the conditions on which it would
subject itself to the judgment of the courts in the collection of its revenues.
In the exercise of that right, it declares by paragraph 3224 that its officers
shall not be enjoined from collecting a tax claimed to have been unjustly
assessed, when those officers, in the course of general jurisdiction over
the subject matter in question, have made the assessment and claim that
it is valid. This view has been approved in Shelton v. Plate (139 U. S.
591), in Pittsburgh Ry. v. Board of Public Works (172 U. S. 32), in
Pacific Whaling Co. v. United States (187 U. S. 447, 451, 452), in Dodge v.
Osborn (240 U. S. 118, 121), and in Bailey, collector, v. George (259
U. S. 16).
The district court recognized the sweep of these decisions in respect
of the contention of the complainant that the assessment of this tax and
the threatened distraint to collect it were barred by limitations under the
statute, and was of opinion that as a rule such attacks upon the validity
of the tax could only be heard and considered after the tax had been paid
in a suit to recover it back. In this view we fully concur.
The district court, however, thought that an exception to the operation
of section 3224 must arise when it appeared, as it held it did appear here,
that no provision of law existed by which if the taxpayer when he filed
his bill for an injunction had paid the tax assessed, he could bring a suit
to recover it back because it would be barred by the statutory limitation
of time in which such a suit could be brought.
The court based its conclusion on section 252 of the revenue act of
1918 (40 Stat. 1085, ch. 18), reenacted in the revenue act of 1921 (42
Stat., Pt. 1, p. 268, ch. 136), which reads as follows:
If upon examination of any return of income made pursuant to
* * * the act of October 3, 1913 * * * it appears that an
amount of income * * * tax has been paid in excess of that
properly due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3228,
R. S., the amount of the excess shall be credited against any income
* * * taxes, or instalments thereof then due from the taxpayer
under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall1 be imme
diately refunded to the taxpayer: provided, That no such credit or
refund shall be allowed or made after five years from the date when
the return was due unless before the expiration of such five years a
claim therefor is filed by the taxpayer.
The return was due March 15, 1916. The assessment was made
December 31, 1919. The complainant might then have paid the tax and
would have had two years in which to make his claim, and if rejected, to
sue to recover it back if, as he now submits, section 252 limited his right
to pay and sue to recover. Under such a construction and application of
section 252, suit must have been brought on or before March 15, 1921.
This is what Phellis did (United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156), and
there was no question raised as to his right to bring the suit in the court
of claims to recover back the tax paid by him if it had proved to be
illegally assessed and collected. Certainly complainant could not, by
delaying his payment until his right to sue to recover it back expired,
make a case so extraordinary and entirely exceptional as to render section
3224, Revised Statutes, inapplicable.
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If it be said that he was waiting for the commissioner to act on his
claim for abatement of the assessment, it is enough to say that the com
missioner’s delay until after the decision of the Phellis case in November,
1921, was due to agreement by the parties. Nor was he prevented from
paying the assessment by his claim for abatement.
The cases complainant’s counsel rely on do not apply. The cases of
Lipke v. Lederer (259 U. S. 557) and Regal Drug Corporation v. Wardell,
decided December 11, 1922, were not cases of enjoining taxes at all. They
were illegal penalties in the nature of punishment for a criminal offense.
Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. (157 U. S. 429) and Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240 U. S. 1) were suits by stockholders against
corporations to restrain the corporations from paying taxes alleged to be
unconstitutional. Hill v. Wallace (259 U. S. 44) was in part a suit like
the foregoing. It was a bill filed by members of the Chicago board of
trade to prevent the governing board from applying to the secretary of
agriculture to have the board of trade designated as a “contract market”
under the future trading act on the ground that the act was unconstitutional
and its operation would impair the value of the board to its members.
Without such designation, no member could have sold grain for future
delivery without paying a prohibitive tax, and if he sold without paying
the tax, he was subjected to heavy criminal penalties. To pay such a tax
on each of the many thousands of transactions on the board, and to sue to
recover them back would have been utterly impracticable. It would have
blocked the entire future grain business of the country and would have
seriously injured not only the members of the board but also the producing
and consuming public. This phase of the situation was so clear that the
government in effect consented to the temporary injunction. See Hill v.
Wallace (257 U. S. 310, s. c. 615). Under these extraordinary and most
exceptional circumstances, it was held that section 3224 was not applicable
to prevent an injunction against collection of such a prohibitive tax imposed
for the purpose of regulating the future grain business with all the unnec
essary and disastrous consequences its enforcement would entail if the act
was unconstitutional. Hill v. Wallace should, in fact, be classed with
Lipke v. Lederer, supra, as a penalty in the form of a tax. Certainly we
have no such case here.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to consider whether
section 252 of the revenue act of 1921, in connection with section 3226,
Revised Statutes, as amended by the same revenue act of 1921, barred
complainant’s right to pay the tax and sue to recover it back at the time
of filing his bill, as held by the district court. It is certain that by the
amendments to section 252 and section 3226, Revised Statutes by the act
of March 4, 1923 (Public No. 527), the complainant is given the right
now to pay the tax, and sue to recover it back, and in such a suit to raise
the questions as to the value of the stock and the amount of the resulting
tax and also as to the bar of time against the assessment which he
attempted to raise in the bill.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the district court with directions to dissolve the temporary
injunction and to dismiss the bill.
(T. D. 3487—June 6, 1923)
Estate tax—Reservation of powers.
Article 21, Regulations No. 63, and article 25, Regulations No. 37,
amended.
Article 21 of regulations No. 63 and article 25 of regulations No. 37
are hereby amended to read as follows:
Reservation of powers.—Where a transfer by trust or otherwise is
subject to revocation by the donor, or the terms thereof may be altered
or amended by him, or he reserves to himself the right to take or assume
either full or partial control of the transferred property, or to direct or
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control the management thereof, all facts and circumstances bearing upon
the donor’s intent are to be considered, and if it appears that he intended
the transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
then the value of the transferred property should be included in the gross
estate, unless it further appears that the transfer was a bona fide sale for
a fair consideration in money or money’s worth.
(T. D. 3488—June 9, 1923)
Income tax—Additional exclusions, act of 1921.
Amending subdivision (1) of article 89, regulations No. 62 (1922 edition)
relative to the earnings derived by a nonresident alien or foreign cor
poration from the operation of a ship or ships documented under the
laws of a foreign country.
Regulations No. 62 (1922 edition) is amended by amplifying sub
division (1) of article 89 to read as follows:
Art. 89. Additional exclusions from gross income under the revenue
act of 1921.—The following additional exclusions from gross income not
provided by the revenue act of 1918 are allowed by the revenue act of 1921:
(1) So much of the income from sources within the United States
of a nonresident alien individual or a foreign corporation as consists of
earnings derived from the operation of a ship or ships documented under
the laws of a foreign country which grants an equivalent exemption to
citizens of the United States nonresident in such foreign country and to
corporations organized in the United States. (a) The following is an
incomplete list of the foreign countries which either impose no income tax
or in imposing such tax, exempt from taxation so much of the income of
a citizen of the United States nonresident in such foreign country and of
a corporation organized in the United States as consists of earnings
derived from the operation of a ship or ships documented under the laws
of the United States: Argentine Republic, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt,
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, St. Lucia, Siam, Sweden,
Venezuela. (b) The following is an incomplete list of the foreign coun
tries which, in imposing an income tax upon the income of citizens of the
United States nonresident in such countries or of corporations organized
in the United States, do not exempt from taxation the earnings derived
from the operation of a ship or ships documented under the laws of the
United States: Antigua, Belgium, British Honduras, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Fiji, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Grenada, India, Jamaica, Japan, New
Zealand, Peru, St. Vincent, Straits Settlements, Trinidad, Union of South
Africa. So much of the income from sources within the United States
of a nonresident alien individual or of a foreign corporation as consists of
earnings derived from the operation of a ship or ships documented under
the laws of any of the countries in the first list is not required to be
included in the gross income of such nonresident alien individual or
foreign corporation for the purpose of federal income tax. The income
from sources within the United States of a nonresident alien individual
or of a foreign corporation from earnings derived from the operation of
a ship or ships documented under the laws of any of the countries in the
second list is required to be included in the gross income of such non
resident alien individual or foreign corporation and is subject to federal
income tax. If a nonresident alien individual or a foreign corporation
receives income from sources within the United States consisting of
earnings derived from the operation of a ship or ships documented under
the laws of a foreign country which is in neither list, such nonresident
alien individual or foreign corporation is required to furnish satisfactory
proof either (a) that such foreign country imposes no income tax, or
(b) if an income tax is imposed that the foreign statute grants an
equivalent exemption to citizens of the United States nonresident in such
country and to corporations organized in the United States.
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(T. D. 3492—June 16, 1923)
Appeals and hearings.
Article 1006, regulations No. 62, as amended by T. D. 3409, further
amended.
Article 1006, regulations No. 62, as amended by T. D. 3409, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Appeals and hearings.—Section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1921
provides that if upon examination of a return made under the revenue act
of 1916, 1917, 1918, or 1921, an income or excess-profits tax or a deficiency
therein (which deficiency is defined in section 250 (b) as meaning the
difference, to the extent not covered by any credit due to the taxpayer
under section 252, between the amount of the tax already paid and that
which should have been paid) is discovered the taxpayer shall be notified
thereof and shall have the right of an appeal and a hearing before an
assessment is made. As soon as practicable, therefore, after a return is
filed, whether by the taxpayer or as provided in section 3176, Revised
Statutes, as amended, it is examined, and if a tax or a deficiency in tax is
discovered, the taxpayer shall be notified thereof by registered mail and
a period of not less than 30 days given the taxpayer in which to file an
appeal to the commissioner and show cause or reason why such tax or
deficiency should not be paid. Full 30 days from the mailing (not the
receipt) of such notice to file an appeal shall be given the taxpayer. The
appeal must be addressed to the commissioner of internal revenue, Wash
ington, D. C., and must be filed in his office within 31 days from the mailing
of the notice, but if it is mailed in time to be received by the commissioner
within such period in the ordinary course of the mails it will be considered
as having been filed within such period. The appeal should be clearly
designated as an appeal from the income-tax unit to the commissioner
and must be under oath. It should contain (a) the name and address of
the taxpayer (in the case of an individual the residence and in the case
of a corporation the principal office or place of business; (b) in the case
of a corporation the name of the state of incorporation; (c) a designation
by date and symbol of the registered notice or notices from which the
appeal originates; (d) a designation of the year or years involved and a
statement of the amount of tax in dispute for each year; (e) an itemized
schedule of the findings of the unit to which the taxpayer takes exception,
accompanied by a summary statement of the grounds upon which the
taxpayer relies in connection with each exception; (f) in case the taxpayer
desires further conference with the income-tax unit, as provided in the
second paragraph of this article, a request for such conference; and (g)
a statement that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.
Upon the receipt of the appeal and before it is made the subject of
a hearing by the agency designated by the commissioner as hereinafter
provided, the appeal will be referred to the income-tax unit in Washington.
The taxpayer may at the time of appealing request a conference before
the income-tax unit to be held within a period prior to the expiration of
30 days after the time for the filing of an appeal. All data relied upon
by the taxpayer in connection with his appeal (including affidavits as to
facts and briefs of argument) shall be filed with the income-tax unit 5
days prior to the date fixed for any such conference, or, if no such confer
ence is requested, such data shall be filed with the income-tax unit within
a period prior to the expiration of 25 days after the time for the filing of
an appeal. Upon cause shown the taxpayer may obtain from the incometax unit a reasonable extension of time for holding such conference or
filing such data beyond the periods of limitation hereinbefore specified.
Any request for such additional time shall state specifically the reasons
therefor and such statement shall be under oath. If, pursuant to con
ference, the income-tax unit and the taxpayer reach an agreement respect
ing the amount of the proposed assessment, such amount shall be assessed
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forthwith, and in case upon examination of the data submitted by the
taxpayer without conference the unit concedes that no additional tax is
due, the taxpayer shall be so notified forthwith. If the income-tax unit
and the taxpayer are unable to reach an agreement respecting the amount
of the proposed assessment, or if the taxpayer fails to request a confer
ence before the income-tax unit, the appeal shall be transmitted by the
income-tax unit to such agency as the commissioner may designate for
consideration and hearing, accompanied by a letter of transmittal (of
which a copy shall be sent contemporaneously to the taxpayer by registered
mail) containing the following information and data: (a) A designation
of the division of the income-tax unit from which the appeal is trans
mitted; (b) the name and address of the taxpayer; (c) a designation of
the taxable period or periods involved and of the additional1 assessments
proposed for each such period; (d) a statement of such issues raised by
the appeal as are not conceded by the unit together with a brief summary
of the unit’s grounds for not conceding such issues, including a reference
to the law, regulations, and rulings upon which the unit relies in support
of its position, and (e) a statement of the dates of any conferences between
the income-tax unit and the taxpayer, and specifically a statement whether
any conference was requested by and granted to the taxpayer subsequent
to the registered notice as provided in this article. Opportunity for an
oral hearing on appeal before the agency designated by the commissioner
shall be granted if requested in the appeal or within 20 days after the
mailing of the transmittal letter, as hereinbefore provided. The appeal
must not, however, be made the occasion for the presentation of new
evidence other than that submitted to the income-tax unit as provided in
this paragraph.
In the case of a return which is examined in the collector’s office,
where a tax or deficiency therein is discovered, the taxpayer will be
notified thereof by registered mail and the same period given the tax
payer in which to file an appeal to the commissioner and show cause or
reason why such tax or deficiency should not be paid. Such appeal shall
be filed in the manner prescribed above. The procedure in connection with
such appeal shall be the same as hereinbefore provided in the case of
appeals from decisions of the income-tax unit, except that upon receipt
of the appeal it will be referred to the collector’s office where the proposed
assessment is being considered and the taxpayer’s conference prior to the
prosecution of the appeal shall be a conference with the collector or his
representatives.
No assessment under section 250 (d) shall be made without notifica
tion to the taxpayer of his right to appeal and show cause, except that in
any case where the commissioner believes that the collection of the amount
due will be jeopardized by delay, he may make the assessment without
giving such notice or awaiting the conclusion of a hearing.
Where a taxpayer has been given an opportunity to appeal and has not
done so, as above set forth, and an assessment has been made, or where
a taxpayer has appealed and an assessment in accordance with the final
decision on such appeal has been made, no claim in abatement of the
assessment shall be entertained.
Where an assessment has been made without giving the taxpayer an
opportunity to appeal, or without awaiting a decision on an appeal that has
been perfected, a bona fide claim in abatement of the assessment, filed
within 10 days after notice and demand by the collector, may be entertained.
When a taxpayer shall have taken advantage (or had the opportunity
so to do) of the procedure outlined in this article, and the case has been
completed pursuant thereto by notification to the taxpayer of final decision
on appeal as approved by the commissioner or by assessment, the case will
not be reopened except where it is materially affected by the change of
regulations or by the final decision of another case either by the com
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missioner of internal revenue or by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
application for reopening a case must be addressed to the commissioner
of internal revenue, must state succinctly the circumstances upon which
the application is based and must be supported by the affidavit of the
petitioner.
(T. D. 3494—June 22, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Income Tax—Income From Exports—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied upon net income from the business of exporting
goods from the United States and selling such goods in foreign countries
is not a tax laid on articles exported from any state in. violation of article
1, section 9, clause 5, of the constitution of the United States.
2. Same—Revenue Act of 1918—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied under the revenue act of 1918 upon net income
from the business of exporting goods from the United States and selling
them in foreign countries does not deprive the taxpayer of his property
without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment to the
constitution of the United States, even though the act be construed as
exempting from such tax the income of foreign corporations from like
sources; nor does such a tax violate the rule of uniformity.
The attached decision of the district court of the United States,
southern district of New York, in the case of National Paper and Type
Co. v. William H. Edwards, collector of internal revenue for the second
district of New York, is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.
District Court of the United States, Southern District of New York.
National Paper and Type Co., plaintiff, v. William H. Edwards, collector
of internal revenue for the second district of New York, defendant.
(May 26, 1923)
Mack, circuit judge: This is a suit to recover the sum of $183,844.14,
income and excess-profits taxes assessed against the plaintiff for the fiscal
year ending March 31, 1919, under sections 230, 233, and 301 of the revenue
act of 1918 and alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff under protest.
It appears from the complaint that during the year in question the
plaintiff was engaged in the business of exporting goods from the United
States and of selling such goods in foreign countries. The total gross
business of the plaintiff for the period was $6,435,512.69, of which amount
$6,295,165.87 were sales of goods by the plaintiff in foreign countries after
the goods had been exported there, and $158,346.82 were sales to export
commission merchants in this country with the intent and purpose that the
goods should be exported and with the result that the goods were actually
exported. The validity of the taxes assessed is assailed in the complaint
on two grounds: (a) That the taxes are upon exports in violation of
article 1, section 9, clause 5, of the constitution; and (b) that the taxes are
unequal, discriminating, and unfair, and in consequence null and void,
because the income of foreign corporations engaged in exporting goods
from the United States is not subject to tax under similar circumstances.
The defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the facts alleged are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
In the light of the decision in Peck & Co. v. Lowe, collector (247
U. S. 165), in which the supreme court held, under the income-tax law
of 1913, that income of domestic corporations derived from the business
of export was within the taxing power of congress and was not in violation
of article 1, section 9, clause 5, of the constitution, plaintiff in its brief
has abandoned its attack on these taxes as in violation of this provision
of the constitution. It now concentrates its attack upon the law on the
ground that, as interpreted by the attorney-general (32 Opinions of Atty.Genl. 336) and as enforced by the treasury it deprives the plaintiff of
property without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment,
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because it imposes upon the plaintiff’s business discriminatory and unequal
burdens which are not imposed upon foreign corporations similarly
situated.
It is admitted by the government that the acts of 1909 and 1913, the
wording of which differs slightly from that of the act of 1918, were in
practice applied, at least to some extent, to foreign corporations in respect
of income derived from the sale in foreign countries of goods manufac
tured or acquired in the United States. It is unnecessary, however, here
to consider the proper interpretation to be given to the acts of 1909 and
1913 or the act of 1918 as applied to foreign corporations, since I am
satisfied of the constitutionality of the law as applied to the plaintiff, even
though the income of foreign corporations from like sources is construed
to be exempt.
There is, as is now conceded, no question as to the power of congress
to tax the net income of domestic corporations derived from their export
business. The question as to how far it is wise and proper to extend
our taxing laws to foreign corporations that manufacture or acquire goods
in this country and sell them abroad, involves many economic and political
considerations. These are peculiarly within the province of congress,
not the courts. It is perhaps inevitable not only that the rate of taxation
should vary in different countries, but that there should be some laps
and some gaps in the adjustment of the revenue laws of the various
countries to foreign trade. It may happen for a time that income from
some transactions may escape all taxation, while other income may have
to bear its tax in more than one country. But a nation that attempts to
reach out too far in the direct or indirect taxation of foreign trade may
invite retaliation and reprisal. So long as the tax on American corpora
tions is measured by net income actually realized, it is difficult to see
that the American corporations are seriously handicapped in competing
for any particular contracts even if it could be assumed that foreign
competitors were subject to no equivalent taxation by their own govern
ments. Clearly, however, such a handicap or discrimination does not
make the classification such a grave abuse or oppression as to condemn
the law as a denial of due process within the fifth amendment. For to
bring it within this condemnation it must be, as the supreme court says
in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240 U. S. 1, 24, 25) :
a case where although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing
power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the
conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation
of property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the fifth
amendment, or what is equivalent thereto, was so wanting in basis for
classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to
inevitably lead to the same conclusion.
In La Belle Iron Works v. United States (256 U. S. 337, 392, 393),
the court again points out:
The fifth amendment has no equal protection clause, and the
only rule of uniformity prescribed with respect to duties, imposts,
and excises laid by congress is the territorial uniformity required by
article 1, section 8. * * * The difficulty of adjusting any system
of taxation so as to render it precisely equal in its bearing is pro
verbial, and such nicety is not even required of the states under the
equal protection clause, much less of congress under the more general
requirement of due process of law in taxation. * * * The act
treats all corporations and partnerships alike, so far as they are
similarly circumstanced. * * * If in its application the tax in
particular instances may seem to bear upon one corporation more
than upon another, this is due to differences in their circumstances,
not in any uncertainty or want of generality in the tests applied.
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
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